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POST-SETTLEMENT MALPRACTICE: UNDOING
THE DONE DEAL
Lynn A. Epstein*
Clients voice their approval to mediators and judges as a settlement
agreement is reached. A release is signed, the file is closed, and from the
lawyer's perspective, another case ends. The settled case joins an over-
whelming majority of civil cases that are resolved in pretrial settlement.'
Buried within this figure, however, is a more troubling statistic: over
twenty percent of civil cases will be resurrected in the form of malpractice
actions initiated by dissatisfied clients.2 In those instances, and for vari-
ous reasons substantiated by expert opinions, the client will charge that
they could have received a better result in the settlement even though the
client knowingly and willingly agreed to end the case.
In every state except Pennsylvania, a client is permitted to proceed
with the theory that his attorney negligently negotiated an agreement de-
spite the fact that the client consented to settlement.3 In Muhammad v.
Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick,4 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that an attorney is immune from malpractice
based on negligence where the client consented to settle.' Court deci-
sions after Muhammad, however, have uniformly rejected immunity for
* Professor, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author
wishes to thank David Weiss, Esq., for his practical advice and expertise in this area. The
author also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Kevin Richardson and
Brooke Davis.
1. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., NEGOTIATION 147 (1996) (stating that almost 95% of
cases filed in court are settled).
2. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1739 (1994). Mr. Ramos conducted a survey which concluded that
21.4% of all malpractice claims involve the activity of settlement and negotiation. Mr.
Ramos contrasts his study to an ABA report that claims only 8% of malpractice claims
involve settlement and negotiation.
3. See Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298,1304 (N.J. 1992) ("Like most courts, we
see no reason to apply a more lenient rule [regarding malpractice] to lawyers who negoti-
ate settlements.").
4. 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1991).
5. See id. at 1348.
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the attorney, permitting post-settlement malpractice actions to proceed in
the same manner as the prototypical malpractice case.6
This Article analyzes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision to bar
malpractice lawsuits based on settled cases. This Article then contrasts
the opinion with the contradictory majority rule in other states. Next,
this Article addresses the difference between mainstream malpractice ac-
tions and those malpractice actions arising from the negotiation of settled
cases. Distinguishing these actions results in a critical analysis which
demonstrates that the majority of courts do not reconcile the vast differ-
ences among the cases, a failure that threatens to impugn the negotiation
process. Finally, this Article offers a practical remedy to attorneys con-
fronting emerging malpractice exposure by advocating that the judiciary
recognize the client contributory/comparative fault defense, coupled with
a proposal that attorneys alter their pre-settlement procedure to include
obtaining a "pre-settlement contract" from the client. By routinely re-
quiring that the client and counsel enter into such a detailed "contract,"
an attorney can inform the client about the ramifications of settlement
while effectively marshaling a defense to a later post-settlement malprac-
tice claim.7
I. MUHAMMAD AND ITS SUCCESSORS
Conventional wisdom dictates that attorneys settle cases effectively, as
an estimated ninety-five percent of civil cases are resolved by settlement.'
Yet, an emerging trend of post-settlement malpractice claims threatens
the integrity of the settlement negotiation process. While malpractice ac-
tions are on the rise,9 most attorneys reasonably believed they were insu-
lated from liability because the client had consented to settlement, and
because there was no affirmative wrongdoing by the attorney. ° Because
6. See cases cited infra note 28. The Pennsylvania courts, however, have continued to
uphold the Muhammad decision. See, e.g., Spirer v. Freeland & Kronz, 643 A.2d 673, 676
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Martos v. Concilio, 629 A.2d 1037, 1039 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Miller
v. Berschler, 621 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
7. This Article defines the term "post settlement claim" as a suit initiated by a former
client against his counsel directly relating to the outcome obtained in settlement.
8. See MURRAY, supra note 1, at 147.
9. See Ramos, supra note 2, at 1659-61 (stating that malpractice lawsuits are becom-
ing increasingly widespread, yet statistical data on malpractice is difficult to gather because
insurance companies, lawyers, and the ABA remain reluctant to release information); see
also Katherine Bishop, California Lawyers Must Take Refresher Courses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1991, at B7 (reporting that in California, one in every five lawyers has been sued for
malpractice).
10. See Joyce K. Baker-Selesky, Commentary, Negligence in Failing to Settle Lawsuits:
Malpractice Actions and Their Defenses, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 191, 207 (1996) (stating that
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so many factors influence a client's decision to settle,11 and because so
many individuals, such as judges and mediators, are a part of the process,
it would appear fundamentally unfair to hold the attorneys solely respon-
sible for such malpractice claims. This is buttressed by a majority view-
point which looks unfavorably upon malpractice claims that require the
judiciary to infiltrate the negotiation process, a process traditionally
viewed as immune from judicial scrutiny.
Balancing these competing interests, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
barred such malpractice actions to foster the negotiation and settlement
process. 12 In Muhammad, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that,
absent fraud, an attorney is immune from suit by a former client dissatis-
fied with a settlement that the former client agreed to enter.'3
Pamela and Abdullah Muhammad sued the firm of Strassburger, Mc-
Kenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick for malpractice arising from the
settlement of an underlying medical malpractice suit. 4 In the underlying
action, the Muhammads sued the physicians and hospital that performed
a circumcision on their son who died as a consequence of general anes-
thesia used during the procedure.' 5
The Muhammads retained the Strassburger law firm.' 6 The physicians
and hospital offered to settle the malpractice claim for $23,000, which was
subsequently increased to $26,500 at the suggestion of the trial court. 7
The Muhammads accepted the settlement offer.' 8 The Muhammads
later grew dissatisfied with the amount received in settlement and in-
some courts have not held lawyers liable where the lawyers exercised professional
judgment).
11. See United States v. White, 650 F. Supp. 904, 906 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing a variety
of factors leading to settlement, including the following: the amount involved in this partic-
ular case, the seriousness of the problem, and the experience of the attorney), rev'd, 853
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A
Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
322 (1991) (arguing that relevant factors include: "(1) the nature of the parties and the
relationships between them; (2) their arrangements for paying their attorneys; (3) the exist-
ence or absence of insurance to pay the damages and the costs of litigation; and (4) the
division of settlement authority between defendants and their insurers"). See generally
Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that the
financial resources available to the parties is generally the main factor taken into consider-
ation when determining whether to settle).
12. See Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587 A.2d
1346, 1351-52 (Pa. 1991).
13. See id. at 1348.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 1347.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19971
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structed the Strassburger law firm to communicate this discontent to de-
fense counsel. 9 An evidentiary hearing ensued where the court upheld
the settlement agreement, reasoning that the Muhammads agreed to the
settlement amount and, thus, there existed a binding and enforceable
contract.20
Unable to reopen the medical malpractice proceeding, the Muham-
mads initiated a claim against the Strassburger law firm alleging legal
malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, non-
disclosure, breach of contract, negligence, emotional distress, and breach
of fiduciary duty.2 The court dismissed the fraud counts because the
Muhammads had not pled fraud with specificity.22 Surprisingly, the court
then barred the Muhammads from proceeding with their remaining negli-
gence claim against the Strassburger firm, based on articulated public
policy encouraging civil litigation settlement. In granting immunity, the
court wrote:
[W]e foreclose the ability of dissatisfied litigants to agree to a
settlement and then file suit against their attorneys in the hope
that they will recover additional monies. To permit otherwise
results in unfairness to the attorneys who relied on their client's
assent and unfairness to the litigants whose cases have not yet
been tried. Additionally, it places an unnecessarily arduous bur-
den on an overly taxed court system.23
The court emphasized that this immunity extends to specific cases where
a plaintiff agreed to settlement in the absence of fraud by the attorney.24
This is distinguished from the instance when a lawyer knowingly commits
malpractice, conceals the wrongdoing, and convinces the client to settle in
order to cover-up the malpractice. According to the court, in this in-
stance, the attorney's conduct is fraudulent and actionable. 25
In a stinging dissent, Justice Larsen lamented that the majority estab-
lished a "LAWYER'S HOLIDAY" by barring legal malpractice actions
for negligence committed in the negotiation of civil case settlements.26
Contrasting the new declaration of immunity with the liability exposure
of other professionals, Justice Larsen reasoned: "If a doctor is negligent
19. See d.
20. See id. at 1348.
21. See id. & n.1.
22. See id. at 1348.
23. Id. at 1351.
24. See id. "It is not enough that the lawyer who negotiated the original settlement
may have been negligent; rather, the party seeking to pursue a case against his lawyer after
a settlement must plead, with specificity, fraud in the inducement." Id.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 1352.
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in saving a human life, the doctor pays. If a priest is negligent in saving
the spirit of a human, the priest pays. But if a lawyer is negligent in advis-
ing his client as to settlement, the client pays."'2 7 Muhammad has suf-
fered widespread criticism and is uniformly rejected in every reported
opinion reviewing post-settlement legal malpractice litigation.28
For example, in Ziegelheim v. Apollo,2 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected Muhammad, permitting a client to sue his attorney even though
the client agreed to a settlement amount.3" Apollo represented Miriam
Ziegelheim in a divorce action.3' The only issues litigated at the trial
court level were payment of alimony, identification of marital property,
and equitable distribution of that property.32 After reaching an agree-
ment on these issues, both parties testified in open court "that they un-
derstood the agreement, that they thought it was fair, and that they
entered into it voluntarily., 33
After consummation of the agreement, Mrs. Ziegelheim sued Apollo
for legal malpractice,34 contending that he failed to discover information
about her husband's assets which would have increased the amount she
might have received in settlement.35 The trial court granted summary
judgment for Apollo, holding that Mrs. Ziegelheim entered into the set-
tlement agreement voluntarily with every indication that she clearly un-
derstood the terms of the agreement.36 The appellate division affirmed.3 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the duty to
provide reasonable knowledge, skill, and diligence provides the basis for
27. Id. at 1352-53.
28. See Prande v. Bell, 660 A.2d 1055, 1063-64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (preventing
attorneys from relying on clients' settlement as a defense to malpractice); Grayson v. Wof-
sey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195, 199-200 (Conn. 1994) (emphasizing a
client's right to seek redress after relying on the professional advice of an attorney when
accepting settlement); Baldridge v. Lacks, 883 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (re-
jecting the approach established in Muhammad because it has the effect of shielding attor-
neys from civil liability absent a showing of fraud); Malfabon v. Garcia, 898 P.2d 107, 109
(Nev. 1995) (rejecting Muhammad and allowing a simple negligence standard for a suit
against an attorney); Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1304 (N.J. 1992) (rejecting
Muhammad and requiring attorneys to render competent advice).
29. 607 A.2d 1298 (N.J. 1992).
30. See id. at 1304.
31. See id. at 1300.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 1301.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 1300.
36. See id. at 1302.
37. See id. at 1303. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on all counts but one. See id. It found a dispute of material fact did exist over
whether the attorney was negligent in advising Ms. Zegelheim to accept the settlement
offer. See id.
1997]
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a legal malpractice action even when the client consents to settlement of
the underlying civil action. 8 In addition to Zeigelheim's consent, the
family court judge's proclamation that the settlement was "fair and equi-
table" did not preclude the legal malpractice action.39 The Supreme
Court added:
The fact that a party received a settlement that was "fair and
equitable" does not mean necessarily that the party's attorney
was competent or that the party would not have received a more
favorable settlement had the party's incompetent attorney been
competent. Thus, in this case, notwithstanding the family
court's decision, Mrs. Ziegelheim still may proceed against
Apollo in her negligence action.4°
The New Jersey Supreme Court tempered its decision by qualifying
that it did not intend to "open the door" to legal malpractice suits by
every former client who had previously agreed to civil suit settlement.4
The court cautioned that in order to state this genre of legal malpractice,
a former dissatisfied client must specify, with particularity, the alleged
malpractice.42 Hence, a general plea by dissatisfied clients who later de-
cide they should have obtained more money in settlement will not be
successful.43 The court also reiterated that an attorney will not be held to
an unrealistically infallible standard of securing the maximum outcome in
settlement:44 an attorney's duty remains one of reasonable skill and
knowledge.45
While most courts are expeditious in determining that an attorney is
not absolutely immune from legal malpractice actions when the client
consents to settlement, they are also uniform in expressing a desire to
foster protection over the negotiation process. In Prande v. Bell,46 plain-
tiff Luisa Prande sued her former attorneys, John T. Bell and Elbert
Shore (the Bell firm), alleging they negligently settled claims arising from
her motor vehicle personal injury action.47 The Bell firm represented the
38. See id. at 1303-04, 1306.
39. Id. at 1305.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1306.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. "[W]e acknowledge that attorneys who pursue reasonable strategies in
handling their cases and who render reasonable advice ... cannot be held liable for the
failure of their strategies or for any unprofitable outcomes that result because their clients
took their advice." Id.
45. See id.
46. 660 A.2d 1055 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
47. See id. at 1056-57.
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plaintiff in two automobile accidents.4" In the first lawsuit, Prande ac-
cepted $7,500 to settle her personal injury suit in which she signed a re-
lease.4 9 According to the Bell firm, she verbally agreed to settle the
second lawsuit for $3,000, but refused to sign the release.5"
Defendant Wishart then filed a motion to enforce the settlement.51
The plaintiff's attorney informed Ms. Prande that she should attend the
hearing "'in the event that you seek or wish to contest the matter of
whether we had your authorization to accept a settlement."' 52 Prande
failed to appear, and the court granted Wishart's motion, dismissing with
prejudice the personal injury lawsuit.53 Prande then initiated a legal mal-
practice action against the Bell firm, claiming that it "negligently advised
[her] to accept unreasonable and inadequate settlements of her claims."54
The lower court granted summary judgment for the Bell firm, ruling that
the plaintiff merely wished "to relitigate the matters that have already
been decided and resolved" by settlement, and concluding that permit-
ting the legal malpractice action to proceed to trial would result in never-
ending litigation.55
The appellate court reversed, reasoning that when the client voluntarily
accepts a settlement, she does not absolve her attorney from liability for
negligence committed during settlement negotiation. 6 Rejecting
Muhammad's hard and fast rule, the court determined that the important
public policy of encouraging settlements was outweighed by an attorney's
responsibility to advise his client with the same skill, knowledge, and dili-
gence in the negotiation of civil suit settlement as that which an attorney
must employ in all other litigation tasks.57 The court also cautioned,
however, that post-settlement malpractice actions involving an attorney's
judgment and recommendation whether to settle is not malpractice sim-
ply because another attorney would not have recommended settlement.5
Thus, the court held that to recover, a plaintiff must allege specifically
48. See id. at 1057.
49. See id. at 1058 & n.3.
50. See id. at 1059.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1059.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1060.
56. See id. at 1064.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1064-65. The court noted that plaintiffs must allege their claims with
specificity and that no bright-line rule exists regarding this type of malpractice. See id.
1997]
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that the attorney's recommendation to settle is one that no reasonable
attorney would have made.59
Though Prande requires a higher standard for alleging malpractice, it
focuses solely on the conduct of the attorney. Both Prande and Apollo
ignore the client's role in negotiating civil case settlements, failing to ex-
amine the client's reasons for consenting to settlement. While ignoring
these important factors, both cases establish guidelines for post-settle-
ment legal malpractice which allow the cause to proceed only if the client
alleges specific acts of negligence; typically such allegations are supported
by expert testimony.60 Both courts seek to address the importance of
safeguarding the negotiation process in an effort to encourage settlements
and discourage clients from seeking redress based on bald assumptions
that they should have received more money. Yet, because these post-
settlement legal malpractice suits are difficult to define, courts apply
pleading requirements differently. Illustrative of this intellectual debate
is the Nevada Supreme Court's decision, relaxing the Apollo/Prande
specificity standards of pleading.
61
The Nevada Supreme Court also joined the mounting criticism against
Muhammad. In Malfabon v. Garcia,62 Malfabon sued her attorney for
legal malpractice after settling an underlying product liability claim
against Toyota.63 The lawsuit was premised on allegations that the
Malfabon automobile contained a design defect that sparked a fire that
killed Malfabon's daughter.' 4
Garcia investigated Malfabon's complaint and hired a private investi-
gator to assist in the investigation;65 the investigator also sent a demand
letter to Toyota.66 In turn, Toyota offered to settle the case for
$200,000.67 After further investigation, and following consultation with
another attorney, Garcia advised Malfabon to accept the settlement fig-
ure, which she did.68 Malfabon subsequently initiated a legal malpractice
action claiming that Garcia did not conduct adequate investigation into
the product liability claim and that, therefore, her recommendation to
settle the case for such an amount was negligent.
69
59. See id. at 1065.
60. See id.; Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1303-04, 1306 (N.J. 1992).
61. See Malfabon v. Garcia, 898 P.2d 107, 109 (Nev. 1995).
62. 898 P.2d 107 (Nev. 1995).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 108.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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The district court dismissed the suit for failing to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.7" The supreme court reversed, holding
that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Garcia
committed malpractice. 7' Refusing to follow Muhammad, the court
echoed prior contrary court opinions which focused solely on whether an
attorney's conduct fell below the requisite standard of care.72
Although Malfabon may appear to mimic the Prande and Apollo opin-
ions, it is distressingly different in two important respects. First, while the
Prande and Apollo courts carefully safeguarded against precedential
abuse in future legal malpractice claims by requiring the aggrieved client
to state with particularity the specific instances of malpractice and causa-
tion,73 Prande and Apollo also required those allegations to be supported
by expert testimony.74 Malfabon imposes no such requirement.75 In-
deed, to support her claim, Malfabon relied on a result obtained in an-
other Toyota product liability case which had reached trial, resulting in a
jury award exceeding $5,000,000.76 In that comparison case, the jury
ruled in favor of the plaintiff's allegation that a defective fuel system
caused personal injury.77 Although the cases were drastically dissimilar,
mere citation and reliance on the comparison case sufficed to permit
Malfabon to state her cause of action, contrary to the initial trial court
order.78 The Nevada Supreme Court permitted comparison of the settle-
ment amount Malfabon received to the other Toyota jury verdict to sus-
tain the plaintiff's initial pleading.79
Second, even though Malfabon signed a settlement and release agree-
ment, she proceeded to support her malpractice claim by citing a medical
report issued four months after she executed the release.80 The report
concluded that Malfabon had been depressed and had had difficulties
with cognitive tests requiring concentration.8' Malfabon contended she
had been incompetent when she executed the agreement and, since Gar-
70. See id.
71. See id. at 110.
72. See id. at 109.
73. See Prande v. Bell, 660 A.2d 1055, 1065 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Ziegelheim v.
Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1306 (N.J. 1992).
74. See Prande, 660 A.2d at 1065; Apollo, 607 A.2d at 1303-04, 1306.
75. See Malfabon, 898 P.2d at 109.
76. See id. (citing Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 110.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 110 n.2.
81. See id.
1997]
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cia should have known about her incompetence, she was negligent in al-
lowing her to execute the settlement.82
In review, while other dissatisfied clients alleged they had been unable
to comprehend or understand a settlement agreement, it is logical to infer
that clients who claim to believe they are entitled to receive more money
would have no difficulty "comprehending" the amount of money they did
receive. Requiring an attorney to determine whether a client is compe-
tent to enter into a settlement agreement when there is no indication
otherwise would be tantamount to imposing an unrealistic standard upon
the attorney. To anticipate such an unrealistic defense, a properly dili-
gent lawyer would be required to obtain an independent medical evalua-
tion for a client before entering into a settlement agreement or, for that
matter, prior to any agreement substantially affecting the course of ongo-
ing litigation. Absent any prior patent evidence of incompetence, a law-
yer should not be held to such an unwieldy standard.
Malfabon's impact cannot be ignored when contrasted with the post-
settlement legal malpractice rubric. Indeed, the case is more of a judicial
"knee-jerk reaction" to Muhammad than a reasoned attempt to provide
helpful precedent to the practitioner. Malfabon's legacy permits minimal
proof of legal malpractice allegations even when the former client volun-
tarily settled the underlying action. The Muhammad "lawyer's holiday"
has, quite radically, metamorphosed to become the client's holiday.
Courts that do attempt to lump post-settlement malpractice claims in the
same category as the prototypical legal malpractice action leave an attor-
ney exposed to malpractice solely based on the resultant settlement sum.
Yet, in hypocritical fashion, aside from identifying the recovery amount,
these courts avoid delving into the negotiation process, claiming it pro-
tects the sanctity of the "settlement process." This reasoning is circular
because it requires an attorney to prove he did not commit malpractice
without dissecting the negotiation process or the client's voluntary con-
sent. Thus, courts are forced to treat these varying suits differently.
II. POST-SETrLEMENT MALPRACTICE VERSUS MAINSTREAM
MALPRACTICE: THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT APPROACH
The traditional elements for recovery in a legal malpractice action are
1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; 2) proof that the attor-
ney acted negligently or in breach of contract; 3) that such acts were the
proximate cause of the client's damages; and 4) but for the attorney's
82. See id. at 110. The court pointed out, however, that because Toyota was not a
party to the lawsuit, this alleged incompetence would not vitiate the settlement agreement.
See id.
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conduct, the client would have been successful in the prosecution of the
underlying claim.83
The most difficult element to prove in any legal malpractice action is
that the client would have been successful in the underlying action "but
for" the attorney's negligence.84 This "case within a case" element re-
quires the former client to prove both the legal malpractice claim and the
underlying claim to the same jury.85 The aggrieved client must show the
initial success of the underlying case and then demonstrate that "but for"
the negligence of his former attorney, the result would have been more
favorable to the client.86 While this method proves difficult when evalu-
ating legal malpractice in a non-settled case, numerous problems of proof
arise in the post-settlement legal malpractice claim.
Courts that apply the "trial within a trial" method to post-settlement
malpractice claims typically ignore the fact that the client voluntarily
agreed to settle the case, and instead focus on the result that would have
occurred had the case gone to the jury.87 Courts that use this method rely
on prevailing expert testimony to determine whether an attorney's con-
duct fell below the standard of care.88 Using a negligence standard,
courts scrutinize and compare the attorney's conduct to reasonable and
objective conduct. 89 This "trial within a trial" method may be the most
effective in proving malpractice because a jury's determination should
constitute an objective standard based on evidence adduced in the con-
fines of a courtroom. By definition, however, every aspect of a negoti-
ated settlement, particularly its conclusion, is a subjective evaluation
premised on the client's needs and desires, coupled with the various influ-
ences that affect that client's ultimate decision to settle.90 Yet courts re-
frain from examining the negotiation process that leads to settlement for
two main reasons: first, a professed commitment to protect the negotia-
83. See Suelthaus & Kaplan, P.C. v. Byron Oil Indus., 847 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992).
84. Cf. Recent Development, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1547, 1568 (1994) ("[I]n other words
the plaintiff must prove that [the] injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's
negligence.") [hereinafter Recent Development].
85. See generally id., at 1557-81 (presenting a thorough analysis of the proper treat-
ment of a client).
86. See id. at 1567-70.
87. See Baldridge v. Lacks, 883 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that it is
not necessary for a plaintiff to prove the unreasonableness of the settlement, but "what she
would have received had the underlying action been tried").
88. See id. (describing how to prove causation and damages).
89. See id. (concluding that expert testimony on the attorney's standard of care is nor-
mally required).
90. See infra Part II.B. (discussing reasons why clients settle rather than go to a jury
trial).
1997]
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tion process from disclosure in open court;9 1 and second, a belief that
focusing on the subjective reasons a client settles is inimical to the objec-
tive standard that ultimately must govern legal malpractice actions.92
A. Protecting the Negotiation Process
The American judicial system harbors a long-standing policy that en-
courages settlement by keeping the negotiation process confidential and
promoting the effective and efficient settlement of cases.93 By maintain-
ing secrecy, parties and their counsel are more apt to discuss and resolve
disputes freely.94 To facilitate the resolution of disputes, various code
drafters have followed the judiciary's lead by refraining from creating
rules that might, in any manner, compromise the negotiation process.
95
In fact, rules that address negotiation actually promote, rather than in-
vade, its sanctity.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are two examples of governing codes that protect the negotia-
tion process. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 prohibits the introduction of
statements or conduct made during settlement negotiations. 96 The Advi-
91. See Wassail v. DeCaro, 91 F.3d 443, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing the lower
court's commitment to facilitating settlements); see also Muhammad v. Strassburger, Mc-
Kenna, Messer, Shilobad & Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (Pa. 1991) (discussing the
benefits of settlements).
92. See Perez v. Espinoza, 484 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (I11. App. Ct. 1985) (providing an
objective standard in legal malpractice, and frowning upon subjective criteria).
93. See William L. Adams, Comment, Let's Make a Deal: Effective Utilization of Judi-
cial Settlements in State and Federal Courts, 72 OR. L. REv. 427, 448 (1993) ("The most
important aspect of the judge's role in the settlement conference is to create and maintain
trust in the negotiation process .. "); see also Neary v. Regents of Univ., 834 P.2d 119, 121
(Cal. 1992) ("This court recognized a century ago that settlement agreements 'are highly
favored as productive of peace and good will in the community,' as well as 'reducing the
expense and persistency of litigation."') (quoting McClure v. McClure, 34 P. 822, 824 (Cal.
1893)).
94. See Adams, supra note 93, at 448-49 (describing the tension between exchanging
information to reach an equitable agreement and exchanging information to determine the
opponent's weakness).
95. See Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Federal Rules of Evidence, S. REP. No. 93-1277, at
10 (1974) (stating that the purpose of the rule is to encourage settlements), reprinted in
FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
96. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compro-
mise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is
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sory Committee articulated two reasons for this exclusion: 1) "The evi-
dence is irrelevant, since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace
rather than from any concession of weakness of position," and; 2) public
policy favoring settlements.97 Although the rule has some limited excep-
tions,98 it possesses a strong evidentiary protection for parties in the ne-
gotiation process.
Parties to litigation find protection in the negotiation process under
Federal Rule 408, while attorneys are provided similar protection under
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.9 9 There is no specific rule or
rules governing an attorney's conduct during negotiation. While there
are several rules which reinforce the necessity of dealing honestly and
fairly with opposing parties, only Model Rule 4.1 attempts indirectly to
safeguard the negotiation process from abuse. The rule states:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not know-
ingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third per-
son when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6.100
The comment to Model Rule 4.1 states: "This Rule refers to statements of
fact."10 1 In the only Model Rule reference to negotiations, the comment
to Model Rule 4.1 permits the use of negotiation tactics, such as state-
ments concerning the price or value of a transaction, or statements con-
cerning a party's assessment of an acceptable settlement proposition.
10 2
Additionally, Model Rule 4.1 restricts an attorney only from making
false statements of material fact.103 The comment to Model Rule 4.1 rec-
ognizes that, in negotiations, certain statements may not be material."°
Although the comment does not define the term "material," it is gener-
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, nega-
tiving a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
97. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
98. See FED. R. EVID. 408 (listing the exceptions to the Rule's exclusionary
requirement).
99. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.4(c) (1996) (stating that it
is professional misconduct to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation"); id. Rule 4.4 (stating that an attorney should "not use means that have
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person").
100. Id. Rule 4.1.
101. Id. Rule 4.1 cmt.
102. See id.
103. See id. Rule 4.1.
104. See id. Rule 4.1 cmt.
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ally recognized that a "material" fact is one that has a direct effect on the
outcome of a case.' °5 Hence, the Model Rule provides support for find-
ing that peripheral bargaining statements, such as a client's willingness to
accept a certain settlement, are not material to the outcome of the
case.'
06
The Model Rules also place the decision to settle squarely on the client.
Model Rule 1.2 states: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."'0 7 Thus, the client
may ultimately accept or reject any settlement offer based on whether he
believes it is reasonable. Under the majority rule, 108 however, a client
who accepts a settlement may pursue a post-settlement legal malpractice
claim arising out of an attorney's negligent conduct if there is causation.
Ethical rules are meant to monitor an attorney's conduct. Model Rules
1.2 and 4.1 are touchstones for gauging the role of both the attorney and
the client during the negotiation and settlement process. The flexibility
of Model Rule 4.1 permits an attorney to maximize client satisfaction by
creating personal scripts in each negotiation. 10 9 For example, a client
may wish an attorney to play "hardball" and reject an early offer in an
attempt to maximize a settlement. Conversely, a client may wish to make
concessions in order to secure any settlement to achieve closure. Model
Rule 1.2 recognizes that, ultimately, the client decides when negotiation is
complete." 0
Because these rules support the type of gamesmanship that may fulfill
the client's desire, it appears contradictory to foster the settlement pro-
cess by permitting post-settlement legal malpractice claims to proceed.
Furthermore, allowing a client to proceed with a legal malpractice action
based on an objective standard ignores the subjectivity which underlies
the client's decision to settle. Thus, it is paramount in a post-settlement
malpractice claim to explore the reason why a client chooses to settle.
105. See Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 99, 108
(1982); James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotia-
tion, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 935-36.
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. (stating that a
party's willingness to accept a settlement or the value he places on a case is not a material
statement).
107. Id. Rule 1.2(a).
108. See Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587 A.2d
1345, 1352 (Pa. 1991).
109. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1996).
110. See id. Rule 1.2.
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B. Why Clients Settle
Parties attempting to negotiate a settlement typically possess needs and
objectives beyond compensation which are often overlooked by attor-
neys."' Attorneys gauge the amount of compensation on which to settle
by examining various legal standards to determine what a jury might
award if the case were to proceed to trial.112 Yet, negotiation is compro-
mise; an alternative to trial. If the guiding light is the amount a jury
would award, then there really is no purpose to negotiation, unless the
settling party can be assured that the amount received is equal to the
amount a jury would award.
Most commentators believe that an effective negotiator "bargain[s] in
the shadow of the law.""' 3 While a good negotiator must look to legal
standards as a framework for negotiation, the law should be one of many
factors involved in negotiating a dispute.' 14 A client's own sense of what
is fair and equitable, both of which constitute highly subjective factors,
must play a major role in determining whether a case will settle. Cer-
tainly, according to Model Rule 1.2, the settlement is ultimately the cli-
ent's decision." 5
To determine what a client perceives to be fair, an effective attorney
must begin by determining the needs and objectives of the client. Then,
an attorney must work with the opposing party to achieve the client's
goals. The result should be obtained on common ground," 6 with com-
pensation as one factor of many in the negotiation mix. Ultimately, client
satisfaction is best achieved by seeking out alternatives and
commonality. 1 7
Negotiation experts often criticize attorneys for focusing on winning
the greatest amount of money in negotiation." 8 In reality, an effective
negotiator may achieve the optimum result, which may not always equate
to obtaining maximum direct compensation." 9
111. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).
112. See Recent Development, supra note 84, at 1568.
113. JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 193 (1996) (quoting Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979)).
114. See id. at 194.
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1996).
116. See FISHER & URY, supra note 111, at 42.
117. See id. at 42, 70-73.
118. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 764-65 (1984).
119. See id. at 755-59.
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
For example, suppose a client reports he was injured by hot coffee at a
fast food restaurant. 2 ° Following the initial interview, the attorney
learns that his client wants to recover payment for medical expenses and
a lifetime meal pass to the restaurant. Both conditions are agreed to by
defense counsel. The case is settled on terms which the client approved.
Subsequent to settlement, the client learns about a similar case where a
person injured by hot coffee successfully obtained an $8,000,000 jury ver-
dict. Upon learning of this "comparative" case result, the client sues his
former lawyer for malpractice, complaining his attorney should have se-
cured a higher settlement sum. At trial, it is expected that the former
client's expert will testify that the lawyer's conduct fell below that of a
reasonably competent attorney.
A jury, employing the "trial within a trial" method, could determine
that the settlement had been inadequate simply by accepting the expert's
opinion that a jury impaneled in the underlying case would have returned
a verdict akin to the $8,000,000 award, even though the former attorney
followed his former client's instructions in securing settlement. Under
the majority rule, however, the differing results (comparative versus the
underlying case settlement) would be evidence of the former attorney's
negligence. The former attorney, though, would be precluded from intro-
ducing evidence of his former client's subjective reasoning for agreeing to
the original settlement. 121 The inequitable result suggested by this hypo-
thetical mandates that the judiciary adopt an analysis of the post-settle-
ment malpractice claim which includes consideration of the former
client's subjective reasons for consenting to settle, along with considera-
tion of the former attorney's conduct.
III. COURSES OF ACTION FOR ATTORNEYS CONFRONTING POST-
SETTLEMENT MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
A. The Contributory/Comparative Negligence Defense
In a post-settlement malpractice action, an attorney should defend the
action by claiming client contributory/comparative negligence. 22 The de-
fense should be presented by introducing evidence of the client's subjec-
tive reasons for settling the case. 123
120. Any factual similarities between this example and a well known McDonalds case is
purely coincidental.
121. See Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195, 199-200
(Conn. 1994).
122. Depending on the jurisdiction, the court may apply contributory or comparative
negligence.
123. Attorneys have tried to present evidence of the underlying settlement to argue
that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from pursuing a malpractice claim. It is now
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The client contributory/comparative negligence defense is generally
recognized in legal malpractice actions; however, some courts do not per-
mit the issue to reach a jury.'24 This reluctance is supported by the Re-
statement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers,'25 which asserts that the
client contributory negligence defense is available in jurisdictions that
recognize the same defense to general negligence actions. 126 The Restate-
ment cautions, however, that the lawyer/client relationship imposes fidu-
ciary duties by which "clients are entitled to rely on their lawyers to act
with competence, diligence, honesty, and loyalty."' 27 The lawyer/client
relationship imposes numerous duties on the lawyer, while imposing few
on the client. 28 Yet, this cannot relieve clients from accepting responsi-
bility for their own acts or omissions which result in unfavorable
settlements.
For example, in Hacker v. Holland,29 the seller in a real estate transac-
tion initiated a legal malpractice claim against his transactional/closing
attorney.13 0 In response, the defendant raised the defense of the plain-
tiff's comparative fault, alleging that the plaintiff, prior to signing the
property deed, failed to discover certain omissions within the plaintiff's
knowledge.' 3' The court held that the plaintiff could have recognized
these omissions.132 Thus, the court permitted the jury to consider the
plaintiff's comparative fault. 33 Similarly, in Nika v. Danz, the court
ruled that the former client's failure to provide certain information to his
former attorney may constitute negligence.' 35
Courts that permit the client comparative negligence defense, however,
proceed with caution, premised on the view that attorneys should not be
permitted to circumvent responsibility to former clients under the guise
that the client should have known how to respond or act. Thus, even
settled, however, that collateral estoppel will not bar a post-settlement malpractice action.
See Prande v. Bell, 660 A.2d 1055, 1063 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Baldridge v. Lacks, 883
S.W.2d 947, 950-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
124. See Nika v. Danz, 556 N.E.2d 873, 884 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Hacker v. Holland, 570
N.E.2d 951, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No.
7, 1994).
126. See id. § 76 cmt. d.
127. Id.
128. See Recent Development, supra note 84, at 1552-53.
129. 570 N.E.2d 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
130. See id. at 953.
131. See id. at 958.
132. See id. at 959.
133. See id.
134. 556 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
135. See id. at 884.
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when a legal document contains simple English that needs no interpreta-
tion by a lawyer, the defense of client contributory negligence has been
barred in certain jurisdictions. For example, in Sommerfeldt v. Tram-
mell, 36 the attorney moved to dismiss the client's malpractice claim, al-
leging that a contractual provision about which the attorney had
misadvised "was so understandable and straightforward that defendants
had 'no duty to advise what it legally meant."" 137 The trial court granted
the motion to dismiss, and the appellate court reversed,'138 ruling that
although there may be instances where language is so simple that there
may be an issue of client comparative fault, as a general rule "it would
make no sense to say that a lawyer has no duty to a client when analyzing
simple language in a legal document." 39 The court, pointing to the une-
qual relationship between the attorney and client, cautioned that it is the
attorney's duty to explain legal documents whether simple or difficult. 140
Courts should, however, permit the comparative negligence defense to
proceed to the fact finder where the client settled a claim and now seeks
to hold an attorney liable for malpractice committed in the negotiation of
that settlement. In a majority of post-settlement malpractice claims, the
former clients do not claim they did not understand the settlement agree-
ment. Instead, this majority group freely admits they voluntarily entered
into settlement, conceding they understood the agreement and aban-
doned their right to a trial.'41 Only after settlement did these former
clients contend there was "something else" their former lawyer should
have done to secure a better result.
Although there will be cases where the client is genuinely aggrieved by
a negligent attorney,' 42 the majority of post-settlement malpractice litiga-
tion arises from the client's own conduct. In those cases, the comparative
fault defense should be considered by the fact finder.
While the comparative fault defense is available in the typical legal
malpractice action, its use has been limited in post-settlement malpractice
litigation. Collins v. Perrine1 43 is an example of an effective application of
the comparative fault defense. Perrine settled a medical malpractice
claim for Annie and Curtis Collins for $46,000.144 The former plaintiffs
136. 702 P.2d 430 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
137. Id. at 432.
138. See id. at 431.
139. Id. at 432.
140. See id.
141. See Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1302 (N.J. 1992).
142. See Wassail v. DeCaro, 91 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1996) (allowing suit to continue
where plaintiff's facts, if true, would support a finding of malpractice).
143. 778 P.2d 912 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
144. See id. at 914.
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sued Perrine for legal malpractice, alleging the settlement Perrine se-
cured was inadequate.145 Perrine admitted he conducted no discovery
prior to settlement, but defended by claiming the plaintiffs could not af-
ford to finance the discovery.' 46 Additionally, Perrine relied on an argu-
ment presented to a medical legal panel, which voted four-to-two against
finding any negligence on the part of the defendants, a hospital, or a phy-
sician. 4 7 Based on the panel's determination, Perrine recommended the
settlement which the former client ultimately accepted. 48
In the malpractice action, the court determined Perrine's conduct fell
below the standard of care of an ordinarily prudent attorney, premised on
expert testimony that Perrine should not have accepted the case if there
were insufficient resources to finance discovery.'49 The jury entered
judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of nearly $3 million 5 ° and as-
sessed seven percent comparative negligence against the plaintiff,15' as-
signing some responsibility to the former client.
The Collins jury's low comparative negligence apportionment produces
little precedential value by which an attorney can effectively evaluate use
of the client comparative negligence defense against a charge of post-
settlement malpractice. The Prande court, however, does provide mini-
mum guidelines to which an attorney should adhere in advising a client
regarding settlement. 52 Prande provides that the lawyer should hold an
appreciation of 1) the relevant facts; 2) the present and future potential
strengths and weaknesses of his case; 3) the likely costs, both objectively
(monetarily) and subjectively (psychological disruption of business and
family life) associated with proceeding further in the litigation; and 4) the
likely outcome if the case were to proceed further. 153
Many cases of legal malpractice occur from "perceived" negligence by
attorneys who fail to adhere to the Prande criteria. 5 4 Common practice
dictates that attorneys review the four factors in detail with their client
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 915. The expert also testified regarding the highly complicated nature of
the case. See id.
150. See id. at 914 (noting that the exact amount awarded to the plaintiffs was
$2,958,789).
151. See id.
152. See Prande v. Bell, 660 A.2d at 1055, 1065 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (listing four
criteria an attorney should consider prior to recommending settlement).
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Collins v. Perrine, 778 P.2d 912, 915 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that an
attorney failed to gather relevant facts); White v. Kreithen, 644 A.2d 1262, 1263 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994) (indicating that the attorneys failed to appreciate the relevant facts and likely
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prior to settlement. In post-settlement malpractice litigation analysis,
courts tend to focus only on the result obtained (the settlement sum) to
gauge the lawyer's liability exposure, ignoring the traditional factors pre-
ceding settlement. Hence, an attorney wishing to marshal an effective
defense must take pre-settlement steps aimed to protect his client's inter-
est. This will safeguard against subsequent malpractice claims within the
framework developed by the courts.
B. The "Release and Settlement Agreement": Solidifying the Deal
The "release and settlement agreement" is the final written document
ending the litigation and, in many instances, the lawyer-client relation-
ship.155 An historical review of related lawyer-client concern over appar-
ent complications arising from contingency fee arrangements creates an
additional post-settlement malpractice defense. To assure a client's com-
prehension of contingency fee contracts, many state bar associations re-
quire clients and attorneys to review and execute a "statement of client
rights" which thoroughly explains the contingency fee agreement.1 5 6 This
statement obligates the attorney to adhere to specific reporting and ac-
counting requirements concerning fees throughout the client's case. 157 It
also provides the client with a remedy against unscrupulous attorneys. 158
Similar to the "statement of client rights," an attorney should be re-
quired to provide a client with a statement of the case before settle-
ment.159 This statement would precisely articulate the ramifications of
settlement and act as written confirmation of the attorney's work on the
case. The Prande factors serve as effective guidelines to use in the crea-
tion of this model statement. This author proposes adoption of a state-
ment as follows:
PRE-SETTLEMENT STATEMENT OF CLIENT'S CASE
Before you, the client, decide to enter into a settlement agree-
ment, you should understand your rights concerning this settle-
outcome of the case); Martos v. Concilio, 629 A.2d 1037, 1038 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (indi-
cating that an attorney failed to understand the likely outcome of the case).
155. Compare Collas v. Garnick, 624 A.2d 117, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that
collateral effects prevented a settlement agreement from being final), with Martos, 629
A.2d at 1039 (holding that a settlement agreement finalized action).
156. See FLA. R. CT. ch. 4-1.5.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Even if a bar association does not require this statement, an attorney should still
have such a statement prepared.
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ment. The purpose of this statement is to provide you with
information concerning your case so that you may make an in-
formed decision to settle your case. This statement is not part of
the settlement agreement.
A. Status of Your Case.
1. The relevant facts of your case are
2. The following discovery has been conducted
3. The strengths of your case are
4. The weaknesses of your case are
5. The fees and costs of your case to date: - until trial
_- through trial -
6. The likely verdict of your case at trial is
7. This figure has been based on 160
8. You have offered/been offered to settle your
case.
9. This settlement amount is/is not in the range of settlement
figures for cases of your type. 161 This range of settlement
figures is based on
B. Your Rights Concerning Settlement.
You, the client, have the sole decision whether to accept or
reject this settlement. While your attorney may offer you advice
as to whether to accept or settle your case, you are not obligated
or required to follow your attorney's advice.
DO NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT if you do not under-
stand any of the information provided to you in this statement.
Your attorney is required to answer any questions you may
have concerning the settlement of your case. If you have any
questions which your attorney cannot answer to your satisfac-
tion, you have the right to seek the advice from another attor-
ney of your choice or you may contact the bar association at -
-. Signing this document does not waive your right to subse-
quently file a malpractice action against your attorney unless
prohibited by state law. 162 However, your attorney may use this
160. Much of this information is commonly found in status reports to clients.
161. If this settlement is not in the range of cases of this type, further explanation is
probably required.
162. For example, under Pennsylvania law, a client would not be able to sue for mal-
practice based on negligence if he has signed a settlement agreement. See Muhammad v.
Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Pa. 1991). Ad-
ditionally, under Rule 1.8 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, an attorney
cannot make an agreement limiting his liability for malpractice. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT- Rule 1.8(h) (1996).
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document as a defense in a malpractice action if permitted by
law.
163
Date: Signature of Client -
Date: Signature of Attorney
Requiring an attorney and a client to sign such a document adequately
outlines the respective duties and responsibilities of both attorney and
client. The document details the heightened responsibility an attorney
owes his client to thoroughly investigate every aspect of the client's case
and to offer advice. The document also explains the ramifications of sign-
ing a settlement agreement and places responsibility on the client for
making the decision to accept or reject the settlement. Additionally, if an
attorney diligently prepares this form, and if the client signs it, the lawyer
would be entitled to utilize the agreement in a subsequent post-settle-
ment malpractice action within the context of a client contributory negli-
gence defense.164 Introduction of the document into evidence would
require the reviewing court to look beyond the settlement figure and ex-
amine the particular circumstances surrounding the settlement agree-
ment; the document inextricably intertwines the conclusion (settlement
sum) with the process (settlement negotiation process and the client's
view of the litigation leading to settlement).
IV. CONCLUSION
Post-settlement malpractice actions are quite unique. While the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court effectively banned these lawsuits, providing for-
mer counsel immunity rather than engaging in the arduous analysis
inherent to malpractice litigation, the better course of action is to permit
attorneys to present the client comparative fault defense. This will allow
an attorney to present evidence of the client's subjective reasons for set-
tling the litigation. Additionally, through the use of a pre-settlement
statement of the case form, attorneys will provide their clients sufficient
information to adequately prepare for a successful negotiation and settle-
ment process.
163. It is possible that a court may disallow this form for a variety of evidentiary
reasons.
164. See Lowry v. Lowry, 393 S.E.2d 141,145 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing the admis-
sion of a separation agreement to show that client did not take the opportunity to evaluate
the agreement).
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